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cerns and to advocate reforms in railroad management on
the one hand, nor to dismiss unreasonable complaints and
-ill-considered demands of the public on the other,-in all
I"ases supporting its views by arguments that appeal to the
reason rather than to prejudice A commission thus conS-ducted will secure publicity of railroad affairs so fsr as they
concern the public, help to create an intelligent public
opini6n to support it, and ultimately to influence railroad
xianagement and policy. But while'all hearings of ques'tions 14etween parties should be public, there may abe
occasions (and will be if. the relations between the commission and the railroads are harmonious) when by private.
conference with the managers and friendly advice as to the
policy of the companies which would promote the interests
of the State, the commission may exert an influence alike
advantageous to the public. and the railroads.
In a word, a railroad commission of broad jurisdiction
- bit'limited powers, if composed of the right material, will
prove the most iiseful to the public.
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III.
CLASSIFICATION.

IT has been stated in a former article that a general

law is one which applies to and operates uniformly upon
all the members of any class of persons, places or things,
requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered
by the law. A class is isually defined as " a group of individuals ranked together as possessing common characteristics," and hence as any class can only exist as such by real
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son of the possession of certain common characteristics, it
is only for this same reason that it can require legislation
peculiar to itself. Whatever legislation is enacted for a
class must, therefore, apply to it in respect to certain common characteristics of its members, and must be itself such
as it would be inexpedient to enact for other individuals
not possessing those characteristics. Otherwise the class,
for whatever purpose it might probably exist as such, would
not be a real, complete class for the purposes of legislation, and the legislation would be local or special, not
general.
The subject-matter of every general law that has ever
been enacted necessarily limits application to a certain class.
Very frequently the distinct existence and distinct legal
needs of the class of persons or things to which such a law
applies has so long been recognized, that the restriction of
legislation to tfiat class is regarded as a matter of course.
No one would waste time with contending that laws
in regard to married -women, minors, corporations, contracts, real estate, murder or other crimes, etc.,, etc.,
were not general laws, provided only that they regulated
these various classes of persons and things in regard to
matters peculiar to each class. A law, too, is not the less
general because it applies to a class which is subordinate as
compared with others. Every class that can be imagined
&isso subordinate, its members being a portion of those of
some larger class. Promissory notes are no less a legally
distinct class of contracts, in regard to all matters peculiar
to themselves, than married women are a legally distinct
class of human beings.
The adoption of the constitutional restrictions upon
local and special legislation has, however, compelled the
enactment of general laws in many cases where no welldefined classes have previously been recognized as 6xisting,
and in such cases a classification is necessary in order that
the legislation which it is proposed to enact may not apply
where it would be inappropriate, and yet may be general
within the meaning of the constitution. It is proposed in
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the present article to discuss the limits of a legislature's

power to classify under such circumstances.
A classification is sometimes directly established or
authorized in the constitution itself, and in such cases the
'legislature needs no further warrant for its use.' Thus,
where a constitution itself regulates any locality or class of
localities as to any matter, such locality or class must obviously be. excepted from the operation of any law in regard
to such matter, and such exception cannot render the
law local.' The constitution has itself made a classification to which the laws enacted by the legislature must

conform.
Another' instance of constitutional classification is
found in the two forms of county government, authorized
by the constitutions of most of the Western States. Under
these constitutions some counties adopt the New England
system of town government, while others do not. This
makes two classes of counties in regard to their local government ; and the difference between the two is such that,
as long as the constitution permits them both to exist side
by side, they must be governed by different laws as to
those matters in which they differ. Hence a road and bridge
law for "all counties in the State acting under a township
I Where the constitution directly confers the power to classify, this
must be done strictly in accordance with the constitutional provisions:
Divine v. Commrs., 84 Ill., 590; Worcester v. Cheney, 94 id., 43o . It
has, however, been held, by a divided court, that the provision in the
Illinois constitution (Art. VI, 20), that "The general assembly may
provide for the establishment of a probate court in each county having
a population of over 5o,ooo. . . . Said courts when established shall
have original jurisdiction, etc.," gave the legislation discretion to establish such a court in any such county, at any time, and did not require its
establishment in all, and hence that a law establishing such courts in
all counties of over ioo,ooo, or over 7o,ooo population only, was valid:
Knickerbocker v.. People, 102 Ili., 218.
2 Wilkesbarre v. Meyers, 13 Pa,, 395. The Act in that case, taken
literally, was unconstitutional, for the constitution had excepted the city
of Philadelphia, while the legislature excepted cities of the first class.
To save the Act, however, it was held that Philadelphia, being at that
time the only city of the first class, was clearly intended to be the only
city excepted.
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organization" is valid,' but is not an instance of classification by the legislature.
In many instances, however, is is absolutely necessary
for a legislature to establish a classification without any
direct authority from the constitution. This often occurs
in the case of laws regulating the government of cities, as
to which the propriety of classification has repeatedly been
affirmed by the courts. As was said in the leading Pennsylvania case on this subject, "If the classification of cities
is in violation of the constitution, it follows, of necessity,
that Philadelphia, as a city of the first class, must be denied
the legislation necessary to its present prosperity and future
development, or that the small inland cities must be burdened with legislation wholly unsuited to their needs ...
But no such construction is to be gathered from [the terms
of the constitution], and we will not presume that the
framers of that instrument, or the people who ratified it,
intended that the machinery of their State government
should be so bolted and rivetted down by the fundamental
law as to be unable to move and perform its necessary
functions." 2
So, in New Jersey, an Act relating td streets, sewers,
drains, etc., in all cities except those of the first class (i. e.,
of over xoo,ooo population, there being at the time but
two such cities) was sustained as constitutional, the excep1 Reynolds z;. Foster, 89 III., 257.
'Wheeler v. Phila., 77 Pa., 338. This case upheld the constitutionality of the Act of May 23, 1874 (P. L., 230), dividing the cities then in
existence, or thereafter to be created, into three classes for the exercise of
certain corporate powers, and in regard to the number, character, powers and duties of certain city officers. Those of over 300,000 population
constituted the first class; those between 300,00o and ioo,ooo the second;
and those between ioo,ooo and io,ooo the third. The constitution of 1874
had forbidden special legislation "regulating the affairs of cities."
Wheeler v. Phila. was soon followed in Kilgore v. Magee, 85 Pa., 4o,
where the Court said of it: "We adhere to that decision, and indeed we
do not see how the question of power could have been decided differently," and many other cases are to the same effect. The road thus
opened through the new region of classification has since been carefully
fenced in, every widening of its borders restrained, and every divergence
from the narrow way opposed by the courts.
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tion being necessary and proper. The Court said: "The
legislation in question comprises the entire schenfe of public improvements in streets, avenues, parks and sewers,
including assessments for such improvements. It embraces
duties which constitute the principal functions of municipal
government. In either of the excepted cities the expenditure for such purposes for a single year exceeds the entire
taxable valuation of some of the minor cities of the State.
Provisions such as this Ad contains might be suited to the
wants. and necessities of cities of the limited magnitude to
which the Act applies. Applied to cities of the magnitude
of -the excluded class, a' exemplified in Ne~vark and Jersey
City, the act'would disarrange the whole system of public
improvements and be productive of much harm."'
I. Th! same doctrine has been recognized. in cases approving the classification of cities for such purposes as the
establishment of courts,' the election and terms of--office of
councilmen,' the appointment of boatds of public works,
and other-officers, 4 the regulation of license fees,' the registration of voters,' and the determination of the. numbr,
qualifications, mode of election, and terms of office of school
directors ;7 also the classification of counties for such
purposes as the establishment of schools," and the compen0 and compensasation of county officers,9 and the duties 1
J. L., 66.
'In Rutgers v. New Brunswick, 42 N. J. L., 5 r,it was held that owing
to the constitution of the district courts and the cost of their maintenance, their establishment uniformly throughout the State was impolitic and unwise, so that they could properly be restricted to cities of a
certain population. So an act establishing police courts, under police
justices to be appointed by the Governor, in cities of 5oooo population,
has been held to be general: Calvo v.Westcott (N. 3., 1892), 25 At1. Rep.,
269; State v. Cammade, id., 933; State v. Delaney, id., 936.
'Randolph v. Wood,49 N. J. L., 85; affirmed, 50 id., 175.
'State v. Fury (N. 3), 25 At. Rep., 934; s.fi., State v. Gibson, id.,
935; State v. Ridgeway, id., 93,6.
5Paul v. Gloucester Co., 5o N. J.L., 585.
6 Ewing v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo., 64.
State v. Miller, o Mo., 439.
sKoester v. Commrs., 44 Kan., 141.
'Commrs. v. Leahy, 24 Kan., 5x; Cricket v. State, i8 0. St., 9.
1 State v. Tolle, 71 Mo., 645.
1 Warner v. Hoagland, 56 N;
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tion' of judges of county courts; also to the classifications
of railroads for the adoption of a scale of charges,2 and
other classifications.'
The power of a legislature to classify subjects of taxation is one of the most important which -it is called upon
to exercise, as it affects directly all persons and property in
the State. Both the necessity for such a power, and the
right to exercise it, obtain, however, independently of constitutional restrictions upon special legislation. The limitations of the power to levy a tax, or to authorize its
levy by municipal authorities, the subordinate legislative
bodies in the State, exist in the nature of things. To levy
a special tax on one or more individuals would be in effect
to take private property for public use without compensation; it would infringe one of the fundamental rights of
the citizen, and not merely a rule of policy which binds
because it is laia down in the constitution.4 Local legislation for the assessment and collection of taxes as distinguished from special legislation of the kind just referred to,
does not necessarily involve -the same injustice, though it
would do so if, for instance, certain localities were taxed
for the benefit of the whole State; but even if local legislation -were confined to the regulation of taxation for local
purposes, it would contravene that general principle of uniformity of local government and administration, which
most modern constitutions seek to establish. Hence in
some constitutions the assessment and collection of taxes
are expressly mentioned among the matters as to which
local and special laws are forbidden,5 while in others' the
I Skinner v. Collector,

42

N. J. L., 407.

2Dow v. Beidleman, 49 Ark., 325.

3 Phillips v. Mo. Pac. R. R. Co., 86 Mo., 540.
4 Durach's App., t62 Pa., 491; Hilbish v. Catherman, 64 id., 154;
Weber v. Reinhard, 73 id., 370; I Hare's Am. Const. Law, 29S.
A legislature's power to select classes of property within the limits
of a municipality, for the public needs of such municipality, is supreme,
subject only to the constitutional requirements of uniformity and gener
ality in the exercises of the power: Bailey v. Manasquan, 53 N. J. L., 162.
5 See the Constitutions of California, Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
6 E.g., that of Pennsylvania.
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provisions as to taxation require that all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects withih the-territorial
limits of the authority levying thetax, and shall be levied
and collected under general laws only:
Such a provision applies to the local authority which
levies a tax as well as to the legislature, and for the same
reason. Moreover, it directly authorizes classification, but
this authorization is not essential, for equality of taxation
can only be.attained by classification. That an equal rate
should be laid upon all subjects of taxation, persons as well
as things, without taking account of essential differences,
would produce the grossest inequality. It is absolutely
necessary tr classify both persons and property for taxation, making the law uniform for each class, in order to
distribute the burden equally, and in proportion to the
benefit received by each class from the expenditure of the
money raised by taxation, or in accordance with some other
just rule.1
%Thuscorporations deriving profit from the exercise of
important franchises granted by, the State may justly -be
taxed in some proportion to the value of such franchises,
and a proper classification may be based on the different
franchises enjoyed.2 Real estate also is not an indivisible
class of property, but may itself be classified. Since the
closely built-up portion of a city requires more outlay for
lighting, paving, draining, police, schools, etc., in proportion to its value than the more rural parts, it is only just
that in providing for this outlay land should be classified.
'Durach's App., 62 Pa., 491 ; Butler's App., 73 id., 448; Roup's Case,.
81 id., 211; I Hare's Am. Const. Law, 296.
2 " Property used by railroad and canal companies for the purposes
of their business ....
is a class universally recognized as different from
any other class in many respects. It is not the abstract value of the rails.
and ties as so much steel and wood, or of the land on which they rest as
farm land or building lots, or of the tangible personal property in itself'
considered, which are alone to be taken into account in ascertaining the
true value of property used for railroad purposes, but the franchise also,
which puts life into what otherwise would be comparatively dead property, of little value. The true value of property used for railroad or canal
purposes cannot be arrived at except by treating it as a class by itself"
State Board of Assessors v. C. R. R. of N. J., 48 N. J. L., 146, 300.
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as "farm," "suburban" or "city," each class to be taxed
at a different rate, but if a tax were imposed for a purpose
concerning all such land equally, such classification would
be improper.1 So, too, the inhabitants of any taxing district may be classified by their trade or business, and license
taxes imposed upon each class, provided that this be done
justly, and such c1assification may even be resorted to, as
in the case of liquor dealers, for .the purpose of restricting
the membership of the class, if required by public policy.'
The power to classify with a view to the enactment of
general, uniform legislation is, in fact, so essentially incident to .the power to legislate that authority is scarcely
needed to prove that it can always be employed for proper
3
purposes, unless expressly restricted by the constitution.
So long as the classification itself is a fitting one, there is
no real difference in principle between legislation based
upon such classification, artificial though it may seem to
be, and that which is enacted for the most distinct and
most thoroughly established class. If the characteristics
of a class be real, and really call for distinctive legislation,
it cannot matter whether they have hitherto been taken
into account by the legislature or not. The underlying
principle of general legislation is the same in all cases. A
law applying to and embracing within its operation all per'i

Hare's Am. Const. Law, 299.
App., 62 Pa., 491 ; I Hare's Am. Const. Law, 297.

2 Durach's

3 "The power [of classification] existed at the time of the adoption
of the constitution; it has been exercised by the legislature'from the
foundation of the government; it was incident to legislation, and its
exercise was necessary to the promotion of the public welfare. Thetrue
question is, not whether classification is authorized by the terms of the
constitution, but whether it is expressly prohibited :" Wheeler v. Phila.,
77 Pa., 338, 349.
The Wisconsin constitution (Art. IV, Sec. a3) provides that "the
legislature shall establish but one system of town and county government," but this, it has been held, does not mean that all laws as to this
subject shall apply to every town in 16he State, without any regard to its
wealth, population, or other peculiar characteristics, and a classification
is allowable which "provides for the exercise of different powers by the
boards of different towns, when there is anything in a town which calls
for the exercise of such different or additional powers:" Land etc. Co.
v. Brown, 73 Wis., 294.
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sons or things which are in, or which may come into, like
situations and circu nstances, is general, no matter what
the persons or things may be, eithe in character or in num-

..ber. -Laws in, regard t, railroads, mechanics' liens, landlens, large cities, small cities, etc., all stand on the
- ords'H

ground in this respect.'
•same
-.

If a legislatue decide not to employ classification as
to a given subject, this decision is final, for local and special
laws onily are forbidden, not those that are needlessly general;. these may be unwise, but are not unconstitutional.
WhateVer classification is employed, however, its propriety
is a question of law, since to ask whether the classification
is, proper or fiot is to ask whether the law is general or not,
wheth~r the constitution has been obeyed or not, -and this
/question the Court has .always the right to ask and answer
whien-properly brought before it. At the same time, it
aiiust'not be forgotten that general legislation is capable of
many degrees. Of two- indisputably general laws within
:the meaning of the constitutions, one may be more
general than the other. In .any. State, for instance, where
fthe constitution does not itself provide what municipal
corporations shall exist therein, the legislature could, con•ceivabl, enact that all municipalities should have the same
powers, privileges and form of'government, and such law
would be general. It could also enact laws establishing
- arius forms of municipal government, with varying
.powers, and all such laws would also be general, provided
that real differences existed between the various forms
established; but such laws wouldbe less general than that
which provided but one municipal system. So, a law providing that all corporations should be formed by precisely
the same method, would be general, but if it were provided,
by one or several laws, that certificates of incorpotation for
corporations of a certain, sort should have -acertain number
of signatures, or be approved by certain public officers, and
that those for corporations of another sort should require
L. P. & Ft. S. R. Co. v. Hanniford, 49 Ark., 291; Humes v. Mo.
221, affirmed; Mo. Pac. R. Co. v. Humes, ix5 U. S.,

Pac. R. Co., 82 Mo.,
512.
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more signatures or be approved by other officers, such law
or laws might also be general. Whether the more or the
less general law be better adapted to the circumstances to be
provided for, or, in other words, whether the classification
should be more or less comprehensive, must be or the
legislature to decide, just as it must decide whether to
enact any legislation at all. The legislature's duty is to
adopt such classification as it may believe to be most suitable, while the Court's function, in passing upon any law
involving such lassification, is to decide "whether, in any
given case, the legislature has transcended its power and
passed a law in conflict with" the constitutional restrictions,' and it is obvious that this is very different from
determining whether the classification is the most judicious
and fitting that could have been adopted.
The definition of a general law, suggested in a former
chapter, states that it is a law for a class "requiring legislation peculiar to itself in the matter covered by the law."'
This must not, however, be understood as meaning that
laws can only be enacted fof a class when required by the
pressure of absolute necessity. Some courts have, indeed,
announced that no law for a class is general unless there ii
a necessity for its enactment in that form,' but this must

I

Ayars' Appeal, 122 Pa., 266, 284.
2 " A law which applies to certain school corporations only maybe
general, or it may be special. Much depends upon the particular matter
of which the legislature is treating. To make such a law general there
must be some distinguishing necessity for the law as to the designated
class. A mere classification for the purpose of legislation, without
regard to such necessity, is simply special legislation of the most pernicious character, and is condemned by the constitution. Mere differences, which would serve for a basis of classification for some purposes,
amount to nothing in a classification for legislative purposes, unless such
differences are of such a character as, in the nature of things, to call for
and demand separate la*s and regulations ........
Since there is a
growing disposition to evade the prohibitions against special laws, we
repeat that peculiarities and differences, which will serve to distinguish
persons or things as a class for many purposes, do not necessarily fur.
nish any basis whatever for a legislative classification. To justify such
legislation, the distinguishing features must be such as to call for and
demand a separate rule of statute laws :" Miller v. People, ioo Mo., 439.
See also Ayars' App., 122 Pa., 266.
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be understood as a practical necessity, a propriety, rather
than an absolute necessity. The necessity for the regulations introduced by a law is not a legal question, and the
same rule would seem to hold as to the necessity for the
limits assigned to the operation of a law. A law requiring
married women to execute their wills in a manner not
required of other persons is not a special law, although the
fact that such a requirement is not uniVersal proves that it
is not a necessity; and certainly no higher rule of necessity
'can be required in the case of a class which owes its
"recognition as such to the legislation enacted for it, than
in that of a class which has long been regarded as distinct.
As classes, b6th must stand on the same ground in this
respect. Were absolute necessity essential to legislative
classification, it would not only be very difficult to prove
the necessity in every case, but the result would be that
every law involving classification could only re-main in
force as long as the necessity clearly existed, and the conseqtfent changeabie and uncertain condition would be
wholly at variance with that permanence in the law which is
one of the objects of the requirement of general legislation.
This reductio ad absurdum indicates that propriety,

rather than absolute necessity, is what requires legislation
to be confined to a particular class.' Cities of a certain
' In Nichols V. Walter, 37 Minn., 264, 272 (approved in Cobb v. Bord,
40 id., 479), propriety and necessity are regarded in this connection as
eqitivalent, the Court saying: "The true practical limitation of the legislative power to classify is that the classification shall be based upon some
apparent natural reason-some reason suggested by necessity, by such a
difference in the situatioh and circumstances of the subjects placed in
different classes as suggests the necessity or propriety of different legislation with respect to them."
In Mortland v. Christian, 52 N. J. L., 521, 537, it was said in regard to
a law affectibg the boards of freeholders in 'one class of counties, that if
the basis of the classification be proper, the act is generAl "without regard
to the wisdom or unwisdom of. applying its provisions to the counties so
selected." It is not perfectly clear whether the Cofirt meant to refer to
the wisdom of the provisions themselves or of restricting them to the
particular class of counties, but apparently the latter was meant. If so,
the words cannot have been well considered, for no classification which
is unwise, which ought not to be made, can be germane to the legislation
sought or founded on substantial distinctions.
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population, for instance, may be classed by themselves for
legislation affecting their government, not because they
could not possibly be regulated by one system applying to
all cities, but because differences in population produce
different conditions in matters with which such legislation
is required to deal, which different conditions may, therefore,, properly be regarded. So, too, it has been, held in
Minnesota that proprietors of newspapers constitute a class
of persons in whose case it-is proper that the procedure in
actions for libel should be somewhat different from what it
is in the case of other persons, not because such distinction
is absolutely necessary, but because " even when exercising
the greatest care and vigilance, and actuated by the best of
motives, they are liable, through honest and excusable
mistake, to publish what may afterwards prove to be false,"
whereas other persons are not so liable.1
The case would, indeed, seem to be one where the
argument 6f Mr. Webster, made in regard to the legislative
powers of Congress under the Constitution of the United
States, is applicable, and where the words "I' necessary and
proper' are probably to be considered as synonymous,I" or,
as Judge Hare puts it, "that being necessary which is
suited to the object and calculated to. attain the end in
3
view.,,

A classification act may furnish a precedent for the
legislature in future cases, but cannot control its action.
The constitutionality of each law which establishes or
adopts. a classification must be judged of separately, and
the mere fact that a classification has constitutionally been
employed in one case does not bind the legislatu.re to
employ it again, even in a similar case.4
No comprehensive statement of what constitutes a
valid classification is to be found in any one reported case,
though they all agree that it must not be arbifrary. It
IAllen v. Pioneer-Press Co., 40 Minn., 117.
2

Arguendo, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (U. S.), 316, 324.

3ir Hare's Am. Const. Law, 107.
I Calvo v. Westcott (N. J., 1892), 25 At.

Rep., 269.
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would seem possible, however, fo embody such statement
in five rules, all of which are supported by judicial decisions, though some authorities rely more exclusively
upon one ground, and others upon another. These rules
are:
I. All classification must be based upon substantial
distinctions, which make one class really different from
another.
,2. The classification adopted in any law must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3. Classification must not be based upon existing circumstances, only, or those' of limited duration, except
where the bbject of the law is itself a temporary one.
4. To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply
equally to each member thereof, except only where its
application is affected by the existence of prior unrepealed
special laws.
5. If the classification be valid, the number of mem,bers in a class is wholly immaterial.
First.-All classification must be based upon substantial distinctions which make one class really different from
another.
Classification is not a mere matter of form. In order
to warrant it real differences must exist between the classes
proposed.' Hence matters whose nature is the same everywhere cannot be classified with reference to place, but must
be regulated by laws operiating in every part of the State
1 "The true principle requires something more than a mere designation by such characteristics as will serve to classify, for the characteristics
which thus serve as a basis of classification must be of such a naturO as to
mark the objects so designated as peculiarly requiring exclusive legisla-"
tion. There must be a substantial distinction, having a reference to the
subject matter of the proposed legislation, between the objects or places
embraced in such legislation and.the objects or places excluded. The
marks of distinction on which the classification is founded must be such,
in the nature of things, as will, in some reasonable degree, at least,
account for or justify the restrictions of'the legislation :" State v. Hammer, 42 N. J. L., 436, 440.
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legislated for. " Thus laws concerning mechanics',' municipal 2 or other liens,3 the right of appeal from taxation-".
the incorporation of passenger railways,5 the taking of
property by the right of eminent domain,6 the refunding
of taxes arroneously 'paidJ or the appointment of notaries,. "
must apply to the whole commonwealth, and cannot be so
restricted as to affect only a certain class or classes of cities,
ctunties or other localities. So a crime which is malum
in se wherever committed cannot be made punishable in a
certain .class of localities only, even though the evil may
be greater there than elsewhere.' In the case of a malum
firohibilum, however, the circumstances which make the
prohibition desirable may exist in a certain class of places,

I State v. Cons. Va. Min.

Co., 16 Nev., 432."
2 City v. Haddington Church, ii 5 Pa., 291.
3 Woodard v. O'Brien, 14 Lea (Tenn.), 520.

City of Scranton v. Silkman, 113 Pa., 191. Similarly, an act making
taxes on real estate a lien cannot be restricted to certain classes of cities:
Townsend v. Wilson, 7 Co. Ct. R. (Pa.), zox.
5 Weinman v. Pass. R1. Co., 118 Pa., 192.
In Reeves v. Phila. TrAction Co., 152 id. 153, on the other hand, an act authorizing passenger
railways, in cities of the first class, to use other than animal power when,
ever authorized to do so by the city councils, was sustained as a general
law, on the ground that the act concerned the control of the streets by
the city authorities, a strictly municipal affair, which could therefore
properly be regulated separately for any class of cities. The distinction
drawn between this case and Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co. may, however,
be questioned. The primary object of the act passed upon in the former
case certainly was to increase the privileges of railway companies rather
than the power of the city councils, and the consent of the councils was
also required in the act passed upon in Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co., before
any railway company could occupy and use the streets. Both acts being
in the interest of railway companies, and the same municipal consent to
the exercise of the powers granted being required in bqth, it is difficult
to see any difference in principle between them.
6 An act providing that cities of a certain class can maintain proceedings to take property by eminent domain only after a previous effort to
come to terms with the owners is local: Pasadena v. Stimson," 91 Cal.,
3457 A law for regulating this matter in counties containing a city of the
first grade of the first class is local: Hamilton Co. Comm'rs v. Rosche
(0.), 33 N. ]E. Rep., 408.
8
State v. Herrmann, .75 Mo., 340.
9
Exfarte Falk, 42 0. St., 68.
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only, .in:which case the law may properly be limited to that
class,' but otherwise it should not be restricted.!
On the same principle, all matters which are the same.:
in any class of localities cannot berestricted to any smaller
class. Thus an act regulating the number of meanbers of
the governing body of a city to be elected from each ward
-cannot be limited to those electing three members from
each ward. 3 So acts allowing cities to fund their floating
* debts; 4 or to provide a system for the granting of licenses,'
or to extend the term of office and fix the rate of compensation of a city officer," cannot be restricted to cities of a
certain population, such matters pertaining equally to all
cities; and although the amount of taxable property in
a locality may perhaps be a proper basis of classification
for, the grant of municipal powers, the taxation of such
property being indispensable to the exercise of such powers,
yet such classification must be based upon this'matter alone,
because, except in .respect to its amount, taxable property'
presents the same characteristics wherever situated. 7
A minute classification, such as is forbidden by this
Burkholtz v. State, 16 Lea (Tenn.), 71. In State v. Donovan, 20
Nev., 75, an act prohibiting licenses to carry on faro or like games, on
the first floor of any building in cities casting a vote of over 1500, was
sustained, the Court being of the opinion that the line must be drawn
somewhere.
2 State'v. Divine, 98 N. C., 778.
3State v. Trenton Com. Council (N. J., 1892), 25 Atl. Rep., 113.
4Anderson v. Trenton, 42 N. J. L., 486. DixoN, J., said: "I am
unable to see any natural connection between the number of people in
a city and its right to fund its floating debt. It is true that there may be
some propriety in denying this authority to very small municipalities
and granting it to larger ones, but the same may be said of almost every
power usually possessed by cities."
5Zeigler v. Gaddis, 44 N. J. L., 363; Aightstowi' v. Glenn, 47 N..J. L.,
1?5 ; Closson v. Trenton, 48 id., 438; affirmed, 49 id., 432. The last was
a case of an act allowing cities of more than 15,ooo population to provide
by ordinance for a license and excise department, but not applying to
any city having a board of excise, or excise commissioners, or where the
courts of common pleas granted licenses. It was held that "in respect
to the subject matter of the legislation, all cities are a class," and that
any attempt to segregate them was an arbitrary selection, and invalid.
6 Helfer v. Simon, 53 N. J.L., 550.
7 State v. Somers Point, 52 N. J. L., 32.
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rule, is sometimes attempted by combining. together a number of characteristics that have no necessary connection
with each other, as in the case of a law applying to any
-city of less than ioo,ooo inhabitants, divided into not less
than two nor more than three wards, and of which the common council now consists of twelve members. Such classification has properly been held to be based on incidents of
too little importance.' Similar attempts to effect special
legislation under general forms were made in Pennsylvania
in the acts designed to provide for holding special terms of'
court in the city of Titusville, a perfectly proper object im
itself, but one impossible of execution without violation of
the constitutional restrictions. The first of these laws,'
-which applied to counties " where there is a population of
more than 6o,ooo inhabitants, and in which there shall be
any city incorporated at the time' of the passage of this act
with a population exceeding 8ooo.inhabitants, situate at a
-distance from the county seat of more than twenty-sevenmiles by the usually traveled public roads," was described
by the Court as " classification run mad ;" while of the
second,' which applied to counties "where there now is or
may hereafter be a population of not less than 6o,ooo
inhabitants, and in which there i's now or may hereafter
be any incorporated city of the fifth class, subject to "the
-provisions of the Act of 23 May, 1874," PAXSON, J., said:
" The act makes no attempt at the classification of cities.
It is merely an effort to legislate for certain cities of
•the fifth class to the exclusion of all other cities of the"
same class. That is to say, it refers only to cities of the
fifth class which are situated in a county having a population of 6o, o0o.
The act was doubtless rtgarded by its
1 Randolph v. Wood, 49 N. J. L., 85; affirmed, 5o id., 175. Both this
case and Zeigler v. Gaddis, 44 id., 363, involved classificatiQn based on
temporary circumstances and at variance with the third rule. See in/ra.
Act of April 18, 1878 (P. L., 29), declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa., 258.
3 Act of June 12, 1879 (P. L., 174), declared unconstitutional in Scowden's App., .96 Pa., 422: A different view would probably have been
taken in New York. See Matter of Church, 92 N. Y., i, referred to ihfra.
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framers as a classification of counties, but it is not so. Nor
does any good reason occur to my mind why there should
be such classification."
So in a recent Ohio case an act-authorizing the cpuncil
to construct sidewalks, assess the cost; etc., in any village
in any county containing a city of the first class, in which
.village no sidewalks had already been constructed under
pie-existing laws, was held to be based on an invalid classification.
Distinctions due to special or local legislation enacted
before the constitutional restrictions existed are not such
substantial distinctions as may be taken account of in
classification. ' Thus peculiarities of local government donot constitute a basis of classification in legislation for
cities.'
Such a classification would, moreover, tend to
perpetnate these peculiarities, the eventual removal of
which is one of the objects of the restrictions upon-special
legislation.3 It may even be doubted, too, whether all such
I Costello v. Wyoming
2

(Ohio), 3o N. B. Rep., 6x4.
A law to fix the term of office of the city's physician in cities where-

it is not already fixed by law is special: State v. Orange (N. J., I892), 25
Atl. Rep., 268.
J., said-3In Fitzgerald v.New BrunsWick, 47 N. J. L., 479, .REED,
"As legislation adapted to the needs of such cities as by reason of physical causes have distinctive legislative needs cannot reach all cities,.
therefore, whenever it does reach all the cities which have the features.
which make such legislation appropriate, it is general. . . . If all
the special features of our city charters can be changed with only the
feeble restriction that the statute which changes them shall apply to any
other city or cities which may happen to have similar features, it will bea distant day when that homogeneity in the municipal governments of
the State, which the constitutional amendment was designed to bring
about, will be attained. . . . Any legislation touching any branch of.
municipal government which is common to all cities, must include, all
cities or reduce all cities to uniformity in respect to the particulars with
which the legislation deals."
Hence, where a statute provided a tenure by good behavior for city
police, except where the term of'office was fixed by statute, and did not
depend upon the will of the appointing power, it was held that "thisclause, by force of the regulation that it introduces, and the exception
by which such regulation is limited, has the effect of giving to some
cities a police force the members of which would hold office guamn benese gesserint,and to other cities a body of pblicemen who would continue:
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specially incorporated cities taken together should be
regarded as a class, and legislated for apart from the cities
incorporated under general laws. This, however, is done
in some States. Thus, in Missouri, a law was held general
-which granted to cities retaining their old special charters,
and of a population between 30,000 and 50,000, the right

to establish and maintain a system of sewerage.' No reason was given for taking into account so slight a difference
in population, but the propriety of separate legislation for
in office only during a fixed period. Such a law is obviously special, as
neither of its establishments appertain to all the citizens of the State,
its defect~being that it proceeds on an imperfect classification:" New
Brunswick v. Fitzherbert, 48 N.J. L., 457, 488.
In State v. Hammer, 42 N.J. L.,-435; affirmed, Hammer v. State,
44 id., 667, the act before the Court was one regulating the number,
mode of appointment, and terms of office of members of the board of
assessment and revision of taxes in any city where such boards existed
at the time of the passage of the act. The decision in the Supreme
Court was put on the ground that the existence 6f such boards was too
unimportant to warrant legislation-for the cities where they were found,
as a separate class, since the result of such legislation would have been
to perpetuate, rather than to do away with, the special features of local
government peculiar to these cities. In the opinion of the Court
of Appeals (44 N. J. L., 67o), RuNyoN, C. J., seems to bring the case
within the doctrine of the second rule, rather than the first, saying
that "To justify separate legislation for towns or counties, there
must be something in the subject-matter of the enactment to call for
and necessitate such separate legislation. As, for example, there are
in certain cities officers, such as superintendents of wharves, etc.,
who exercise functions peculiar to such cities. There, if the legislature interferes it all in reference to such officers or the subjects of their
functions, it must be by legislation not appropriate to other towns,
and, therefore, in such cases, and to that extent, separate legislation
would be proper.
But the assessment and revision of taxes is not
peculiar to towns which have boards of assessment and revision; they
are common to all.
This illustration seems inappropriate, for the act did not seek to
regulate the assessment and revision of taxes, but the formation of
the boards of assessment and revision, which boards were peculiar
to certain towns. The broader ground taken by the Supreme Court
seems the better.
The limitation to existing circumstances only made the act local
under the third rule (see infra), but the opinions do not refer to this
fact.
I Rutherford v. Heddens, 82 Mo., 288; Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97
'id., 543-
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cities with special charters was stated to be due to the fact
that the constitutional restrictions do not show any intention. that'all such cities should become incorporated under
the new general law, a step which it is said they must take
in case of any change in their corporate powers, unless
they may be legislated for by themselves. In Iowa, toowhere cities and towns cannot be incorporated by special
act, nor can any special act be passed in cases where a'local act can be made applicable, an act granting the right
to sell real and personal property for delinquent taxes to
all cities and towns previously incorporated under special
charters, and which do not possess the right, was held to be
general.' The Court said: "The act in question operates
upon a particular condition, and attaches to it certain con,sequences, and whenever that condition exists the consequtnces follow. So that whenever cities are found, in'
whatever part of the State, be they few or many, which
were incorporated under special charters, to them the law
applies." It may, however, be suggested that the way totreat cities with special charters consistently with the spirit
of general legislation is to allow them to adopt all or any
part of the general law for cities of the class iii which their
population would place them. For the purpose of doing
away with their exceptional positions they may be treated
as a class, but for that purpose only ; 2 while matters which
concern all cities, or all of a properly constituted class,
should be provided for by laws. applicable to all, without
regard to their particular system of local government.
Absolute homogeneity of municipal government, while
not to be forced upon the cities all at once, was designed
to be the ultimate result of the restrictions upon special
legislation.
Further instances of distinctions too unimportant for

-

2

Heiskel v. Burlington,.3o I., 232.
Van Riper v. Parsons, 4o N. J. L., 123 ; Fitzgerald v. New Bruns-

wick, 47 id., 479; see Reading v. Savage, 124 Pa., 328. A village act,
applicable to all the villages in the State, which elect to take advantage of its provisions, is general: Arthur v. Glens Falls, 21 N. Y
Supp., 8I.
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classification are seen in laws involving the affairs of
counties. Those counties in which clerk's fees are collected
and paid over for the use of the county do not form a
sufficiently distinctive class for the operation of an act
providing for an assistant clerk in each county.' Nor
can a law provide for the payment of certificates which
had prior to the act been lawfully issued for the purpose'
of constructing or improving one or more roads or avenues,
and for the payment of which certificates the county was
by law authorized to become bound.2 "The certificates,"
said the Court, "were designated in the act by an accident
of their history, i. e., that the county once had authority.
to bind herself to pay them. This not only identifies the
certificates, but is a basis of classification of the counties.
No substantial, natural, or appropriate reason exists for
the distinction in favor of such certificates against those
which, though issued for similar improvements, it did not
possess authority to assume and pay. This is a mere
specification, not a basis of classification."
In accordance with the doctrine of this"rule it has also
been held that where laws for the assessment and collection of taxes must be general, and of uniform operation, a
law to remit penalties for non-payment of taxes assessed
before a certain date, or to ratify judgments consented to
on the basis of such remission, would be unconstitutional,
such taxes not properly constituting a class by themselves.'
I Ernst v. Morgin, 39 N.J. Eq., 390; Hallock v. Hollingshead, 49
N. J. L., 64.
2

Freeholders v. Buck, 5i N. J..L., 155.

3State v. Cal. Min.-Co., 15 Nev., 234, 248; State v. Cons. Va. Min.
Co., 16 id., 432, 449. In the latter case the Court said: "It is claimed

that the statute in question is general, because the legislature had power
to separate taxpayers into classes, and that the persons embraced therein
form a class who are all treated alike. The mere remission, by retroactive
laws, of penalties due from a fraction of delinquents, is in no just sense
a classification, as that word is used by the courts, such as will justify the
distinction here attempted. The only reason why a law for the collection
of taxes, which adopts the same method for all of a class, but different
ones for another class, is, or can be, held general, and, therefore, constitutional, is because it treats alike all who are in the same situation. This
statute does not attempt to do that."
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So, too, while a law may be general which provides for the
formation of borough governments by the inhabitants of
townships and parts of, townships of a certain area and
population, such localities constituting a class for the pur.pose of the transition from a lower to a higher grade of
municipalities,' yet, if the law have a broader scope, it is
not general unless it applies to all grades of municipalities
that are properly within its scope. It cannot grant the
right to form borough governments to the inhabitants of
certain arbitrarily selected grades of municipalities only,
and to those of one grade on different conditions from those
imposed on the inhabitants of another.2 The fact that
certain counties have county road boards has also been held
no reason for excepting them from the operation of road
laws.3 On the other hand, the absence of a work-house
'has been held a proper basis of classification for counties
in a law authorizing magistrates to commit to the dounty
jail in lieu of a work-house ; ' and counties containing poorhouses' may be treated as a class for the purposes of an act
in regard to the accounts of the officers of such poorhouses.'
- The need of substantial and essential distinctions
applies, of course, to other classifications than those of
localities. Thus in Illinois, where all railroad companies
-whose lines terminate on navigable streams bordering
the State have by law the right to condemn lands at
their termini in order to reach, ferries, the roads- that
have exercised this right, and own a landing place for
water-craft, cannot be treated as a class, and given the
exclusive right
'State

to own and use ferry boats. 6

Simi-

v. Borough of Clayton, 53 N. J. L., 277.
. Sloane, 49 N. J. L., 356, 365. MAGIE, J., said: "I"

2 Long Branch

am not able to discover any characteristic of inhabitants of cities and
towns distinguishing them, with respect to such legislation, from the
inhabitants of other municipalities. To my mind they all bear precisely
the same relation to the purposes of this legislation."
3 Bray v. Hudson, 5o N. J. L., 82; Lodi v. State, 5i id., 402.
' Bingham v. Gibbs, 46 N. J. L., 513 ; affirmed, 47 id., 172.
5 Nason v. Poor Directors, 126 Pa., 445.
0Thomas v. W., St. L. & P. R. R. Co., 40 Fed. Rep., 126.
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larly, where a general stock law exists, the facts that
some farmers conform to the law, while others do not, is
insufficient to place them in such distinct classes as to justify legislation in favor either of those who conformed, or
of those who did not conform to the law.'
On the other hand, an act was recently declared to be
general, which extended the time for the completion of
railroads by companies organized under the general law,
but who had not completed their roads within the required
time. It was held that as regarded the time for the completion of the road the companies organized under the
general law constituted a class distinct from those existing
by virtue of special charters, in which the length of time
allowed for completion had presumably been calculated
with reference to the needs of each case.
In a class which is marked by substantial characteristics the different members may, of course, possess these
characteristics in varying degrees, and it may happen that
those of one member may scarcely differ at all from those
of a member of another class. If all cities with a population of less than ioo,OOO constitute one class, and all
those of Ioo,ooo or over, up to 300,000, constitute another,
such classification would certainly be regarded as based
upon substantial distinctions. Yet there cannot possibly
be any such difference between a city of 99,999, or even
99,000 inhabitants, and one of oo,ooo inhabitanfs, as to
require them to be placed in different classes. This simply
shows that a classification of this sort, like everything else
of human make, cannot be wholly perfect, and that the
line drawn between the classes is an arbitrary one; but so
long as it is drawn with due regard to the difference actually
existing between cities of different size, the classification
is substantially fair, and that this is all that can be
expected.
In applying the doctrine formulated in this rule so as
to
reach substantial fairness, the Supreme Court of Pennsyl'Utsey v. Hiott, 30 S. Car., 360.
2

Point Breeze Ferry Co. v. Bergen Neck Ry. Co., 53 N. J. L., io8.
54
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Svania has recently held that the essential distinctions existing
between the various cities of that State call for three classes
and no more.' In Kansas it has been intimated that many
'classes may properly be made, so long as the law is not
made special in its application and results.2 In California
a division of municipal corporations into six. classes has
been approved,' and in regard to the classification of coun-"
ties, made in order to regulate the compensation of county
officers in proportion to duties, the Supreme Court has held
that the legislature must determine how many classes are
necessary. 4 This is, of course, tantamount to saying that
rAyrs' App., 122 Pa., 266 ;,Shoemaker v. Harrisburg, id., 285;
Berghaus v. Harrisburg, id., 289;, Meadville v. Dickson, 129 id., I. In
Ayars' App., STERR=r, J., said: "The Act of 1874 dividing the cities of
the State into three classes, was sustained as to such of its provisions as
have been involved in adjudicated cases, because it was considered with
the spirit, if not the letter of the constitution. As to the number of
classes created, that act appears to have covered the entire ground of
classification. It provided for all existing as well as for every conceivable prospective necessity. It is impossible to suggest any legislation
'that has or may hereafter become necessary for any member of either
class, that cannot, without detriment to other members of the same
'class, be made applicable to all of them. If classification had stopped
where the Act of i874 left it, it would have been well, but -it did not.
Without the slightest foundation in necessity, the number of classes was
soon after increased to five, and afterward to seven, and if the vicious
principle on which that was done be recognized by the courts, the number may at any time be further increased until it equals the number of
cities in the commonwealth. The only possible purpose of such classification is evasion of the constitutional limitation; and, as such, it ought
to be unhesitatingly condemned."
2State v. Hunter, 38 Kan., 578.
3
Pritchett v. Stanislaus Co., 73 Cal., 31o. The question was whether
to pay of a marshal of a city of the sixth class could be regulated in this
way. No reference is made in the opinion to Earle v. San Francisco Bd.
of _ducn., 55 Cal., 489, in which an act relating to the salaries of school
teachers, "in all consolidated cities and counties of more than ioo,oo
inhabitants," was held local and invalid, though by a divided court. It
is to be observed that there population was not the only basis of classification.
'The Constitution of California (Art. xi, 5) provides that "the legislature shall regulate the compensation of all [county, township and
municipal] officers in proportion to duties, and for this purpose may
classify the counties by population." The legislature carried out this
provision in. 1883 by arranging the fifty-five counties in forty-eight
classes, the differences between any one class and the next above and
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the doctrine embodied in this rule is pot regarded in that
State.
In Ohio, cities and incorporated villages are classified
by population (with three classes of the former subdivided
into seven grades, and two classes of the latter), and laws
based on this classification have repeatedly been held to be
general.' Other bases of classification may be resorted to
when necessary. Thus an act giving, as a corporate power,
to "incorporated villages" having within their limits a
college or university, the right to provide against the evils
resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquors has been
upheld as based upon a just and reasonable classification.2
In some States the number of classes of cities, counties,
etc., is regulated in the constitution itself,
below being based on no numerical system whatever, and varying from
5o,ooo to 15.
In Longan v. Solano, 65 Cal., 122, the Court almost
expressed surprise that this classification was objected to as unconstitTEtional, and held that it was impossible for it to say how many classes weret
necessary, that "the proper determination of that question of necessitydepends upon a variety of considerations which are for the legislature,
and not for the courts." The fact that this classification is based on thepopulation as ascertained by the federal census of i88o (a violation of the
doctrine of the third rule, infra), was not needed to show that the legislature intended to make special provisions for each county to whatever
extent they pleased, and the Court having acquiesced in their mode of
carrying out that intention, it is, perhaps, not remarkable that it said
nothing about the classification being based on existing circumstances
only, and the membership of each class remaining unalterable so long
as the law was in force.
Two years later the legislature altered the salaries of the officers in
the various classes of counties, such changes not to take effect until the
expiration of the terms of those then in office, except in the case of
three classes of counties, in which the changes were to take effect the
first day of the month after the passage of the act. *This act was
declared unconstitutional, in Miller v. Kister, 68 Cal., 142, not because
of the minute classification, but because, though of a general character,
it was not uniform in its operation.
IState v. Brewster, 39 0. St., 653; State v. Hawkins, 44 id., 98;
State v. Hudson, id., 137.
'Bronson v. Oberlin, 41 0. St., 476.
3In Missouri four classes of cities are allowed by Art. vir, 9, but this
does not apply to specially incorporated cities which do not elect to be governed by the general system. See Rutherford v. Hamilton, 97 Mo., 543.
In Illinois the division of counties into more than three classes is
forbidden by Art. x, X2.
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Second.--The classification adopted in any law must be
germane to the purpose of the law.
To warrant the restriction of the application of a law
to a particular class of persons, places or things, the common characteristics of the class must not only be substantial, as required by the first rule, but they must also
be of such a nature as to make it proper that that particular
.law should, on account of the subject which it concerns, be
so restricted in its application. In other words, legislation
for a class is general if confined to matters peculiar to that
class, but special or local if it deal with other matters.
Thus, the fact that certain seaside resorts are governed by
boards of commissioners does not constitute them a class of
* localities for the purpose of legislation in regard to road
taxes,1 and laws as to the police or taxes cannot be confined to "seaside or summer resorts" only,2 nor a law
authorizing taxes for street lighting to cities and townships,
which are lighted, by authority of the legislature.'
Cases of classification by population form no exception
to this rule. In such cases, as the Supreme Court of New
Jersey has recently said, the ordinary rule for ascertaining
the soundness of all classifications should be applied. The
question is, does a difference in the size of a municipality,
in respect to population, have any connection with the
need or propriety of the legislative grant or regulation? If
so, has the legislature selected for legislation those municipalities to which the legislation might be the more appropriate? If the exclusive fitness of the group of cities
1

Ross v. Winsor, 48 N. J. L., 95. DixoN, J., said: "The i'ndividuals
thus grouped into a class by legislative enactments are distinguished
from other municipalities by two features only, by their being seaside
-resorts, and their being governed by boards of commissioners, and consequently no legislation touching this class aloneis constitutional, unless
itproperly relates to these peculiarities. We cannot see how the section
utider review is so related. That the power to expend the road tax of a
municipality on its streets should be vested in its own governing body
rather than in the township committee has nothing to do with these
peculiarities."
2 Clark v. Cape May, 5o N. J.L., 558; Alsbath v. Philbrick, id., 58i.
' Van Giesen v. Bloomfield, 47 N. J; L., 442.
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selected is in a substantial degree apparent, then the
policy of so grouping the cities is for the legislature.'
Hence it was held that, as the legislature could, upon
reasonable grounds, conclude that the needs of municipalities for a water supply should be dealt with in a
statutory method, and that the particular method adopted
was applicable to cities of between 500 and 15,000 popula-

tion, the limitation of the law to those cities only was not
special legislation.
On the same principle it has been held in Pennsylvania (where the Constitution of 1874 provided that the
compexisation of county officers, as to which no general
system had prevailed, should be regulated by law, and that
officers in counties of over 15o,ooo inhabitants should be
paid by salary), that acts fixing the salaries of officers in2
counties of over Iooooo and less than 150,000 inhabitants,
or regulating the fees of certain officers in counties of over
io,ooo and less than. I5,OOO,3 are local acts, the counties
affected not differing from the other counties of the State
in any way which would require a uniform system in
regard to salaries or fees in the former to the exclusion of
the latter.
It has also been held in Pennsylvania, where the law
which classified cities did so in regard to "the exercise of
certain corporate powers,". and "the number, character,
powers and -duties of certain officers thereof," ' that for
these purposes classification of cities by population is valid,
but that it is invalid except for legislation in regard to
"the existence and regulation of municipal powers and
matters of local government ;" ' or, as it was expressed in
a later case, "matters that are connected with the organization or the edministration of the local government, or
the regulation of municipal affairs." ' These are held to
'State v. Moore (N. J.), 22 AtI. Rep., 993.
2 McCarthy v. Commonwealth, iIO Pa., 243.
'Morrison v. Bachert, 112 Pa., 322.
4
Act of May 23, 1874, P. IL., 230 , 2 Pur. Dig.,
5Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co., iiS Pa., 192.
6 Ruan St., 132 Pa., 257.
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be the only matters in regard to. which cities need different
legislation acc~rding as their population, the "common
cha:tacteristic" of .each class, may be greater or less. In
applying this doctrine it has recently been held that an act
regulating. the exercise of the power to pave streets and
collect the cost thereof, and authorizing the assessment of
the cost on abutting property, according to frontage, and
the entry of a lien for such assessment, in cities of a certain class, was valid.' The paving of streets being a
. municipal function, and the power to collect the cost of the
work a municipal power, classification in regard to these
matters was proper, while the grant of authority to enter a
lien merely conformed the procedure in such cases to what
was customary in regard to municipal assessments in other
classes of cities. Hence, the law was general in both
respects. The procedure for the assessment of damages
and benefits upon the opening of streets, however, has
been held to have no connection with the exercise of corporate powers or with local government; and, hence, a law
wvhich provides a certain procedure in such cases in cities
of a particular class, has been declared unconstitutional.'
Scranton v. Whyte, 148 Pa., 419.
2Ruan St., 132 Pa., 257; Wyoming St., Pittsburgh, 137 id., 494.

The

grounds of the decision in Ruan Street do not, however, seem perfectly
clear. The Court points to the prohibition of local and special legislation "regulating the practice or jurisdiction of courts," and "authorizing the laying out, opening, altering, or maintaining roads, highways,
streets or alleys," and infers from this not merely the indisputable proposition that all laws as to both these matters should be general, applying to
the same conditions and circumstances wherever they exist throughout
the State; but, further, that in order to be general, such laws "must
apply to all parts or divisions of the State alike," that they "shall be
general, affecting the whole State so that the rule upon all these matters
shall be uniform throughout every part of the territory in which the constitution itself is operative."
This clearly means that there shall be but
one law as to these matters throughout the whole State, that a general
road law must necessarily apply to every road and street in the commonwealth, to the street in the most populous city, and the road in the most
remote and thinly-settled township. This is a very different matter from
simply requiring that laws as to courts and roads shall be general. The
apparently double ground on which the Court relies for the decision of
the case before it is in reality but a single one. If there must be the
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A contrary view would probably be held in New
York," but the tendency in that State is to treat the
restrictions upon special legislation as formal rather than
fundamental. Whether the doctrine that the differences
between the various classes of localities in the State are
sufficient to warrant diffefences in road laws be accepted
or not, it must be admitted they certainly cannot warrant
such differences as would be unfair to the property owners
same procedure as to road cases in all parts of the State, this can only be
because the opening of streets and roads is essentially the same -thing,
under all circumstances and in all places. The fact that there is but one
thing to be regulated is what necessitates uniformity in the prooedure
regulating it. The fundamental proposition of the Court is, then, that
the opening of roads and streets is a thing of essentially the sanle nature
everywhere, but to this the Court gives far less attention than to its
secondary proposition, the necessity of uniform laws as to courts.
If there be anything in the opening of a street or the assessment of
damages therefor'in a large city which makes the affair essentially different from the opening of a country road or a street in a small city, then
justice to the persons and property affected may require that these matters be differently regulated, and if, in addition to this, the opening of a
city street be, as was claimed by two of the judges in Ruan Street,
propeily a municipal affair, a proper case for the exercise of municipal
power, then, for that reason also, a law regulating this matter in cities of
the first class would be general, and the regulating of judicial procedure
thereby involved would be equally general.
These questions, however,
do not necessarily concern the investigation of the nature of general and
special laws. They are questions of municipal government and of the
rights of persons and property. If they are once determined, if it be
once conclusively settled that the opening of roads and streets is esse;itially the same thing everywhere, it inevitably follows that they must be
regulated by the same law. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has
answered these questions, but by a divided court and in opinions which
touch but briefly upon the most fundamental points. The paving, grading, curbing and lighting of public streets are admitted to be municipal
affairs, to be regulated directly or indirectly by laws which are of force
only in that class of cities to which they are made applicable (Scranton
v. Whyte, 148 Pa., 419), but the laying out and opening of the same
streets are declared not to be municipal matters, and it may, perhaps, be
thought that the dissimilarity between the opening of streets and their
actual construction and conservation is not so obvious as not to need a
word of argument.
In New Jersey the laying out, opening and changing the lines of
streets have recently been held to be municipal matters, differing in
different classes of cities: 'n re Haynes, 22 Atl. Rep., 923 ; see infra.
IMatter of Church, 92 N. Y., 1.
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of any particular class or classes. They cannot, for instance,
entitle the legislature to "fasten upon such of the citizens
of the commonwealth as are the owners of property in
a city of the second class, a new, inconvenient, injurious
and despotic system for the assessment of damages done by
exercise of the right of eminent'domain, to which citizens
in other parts of the State are not subjected." 1
In one of the lower courts in Pennsylvania it was held
that an act empowering the county commissioner to purchase and condemn land for county buildings could not exclude counties cofitaining cities co-extensive with them, and
the proviso excluding such counties was afterward repealed.'
It is tcue that the county courts and the usual county
officers are retained in the only county in the State contaiing Such a city, but as a matter of fact the duties of
the commissioners are necessarily different from what they
are in the other counties; no county taxes are levied, and
all buildings for- the use of the county, as well as the
land and the money necessary therefor, have to be provided
by the city or obtained under its corporate powers. As
such an act, therefore, if it could take effect at all in
counties so situated, might involve a serious conflict of city
and county authority, it would seem eminently fitting
that it should not apply to them, their exclusion being
based on a proper classification. . On the other hand, the
act forbidding the sheriff of any county co-extensive in
boundaries with any city of the first class to appoint
deputies to preserve the peace at elections,' would* seem
not to be based on a valid classification. The fact that
the appointment of such deputies, ostensibly to preserve
the peace, but really to electioneer, by more or less irregular methods, in support of the party in power, had become
a notorious abuse in the only county to which the description applied, was no reason for the classification, as the
"Wyoming St., Pittsburgh, 137 Pa., 494.
re Chester Co. Court House, 7 Co. Ct. R. (Pa.), 282; Act of
April 26, 1889, P. L., 55.
3 Act of March 24, 1877, P. L., 36; i Pur. Dig., 658, pl. 75.
2 it
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latter had no necessary connection with the subject regulated by the act. If the appointment of such deputies was
a bad thing irrespective of locality, it should have been
forbidden everywhere, while if it was only objectionable
where there was an organized police force, it should, have
been restricted to those parts of the State where no such
force existed.
Where there is an evident connection between the
distinctive features of the matters to be regulated and the
regulations adopted, there the propriety of a classification
which recognizes those distinctive featureg cannot be questi6ned. - Thus an act authorizing cities on the ocean to
lay out streets, drives or walks on the beach or ocean front,
is a general act 1 for a distinct class of cities, and could not
apply to any others, whatever the language used. So'
natural gas companies and petroleum companies have
properly been held to constitute a class to which the right
of eminent domain may be given to enable them to lay.
lines of pipe.2 So a statute of limitation of suits to foreclose mortgages, except where invalid attempts at fore-.
closure had been made and had proceeded as far as an
actual sale, makes a proper classification. -The excepted
class of mortgagees would not know that their attempts
were null, and the right to foreclose and the power of sale
still remained, and yet, but for the exception, would be
affected by the limitation. "This consideration," said the
Court, "was certainly sufficient to suggest the propriety of
applying to such cases a rule as to the time of foreclosing
different from the general rule."'
Matters which from certain points of view may be
regarded as common to a whole State or to all the cities
therein may yet be rendered different by the different conditions of the localities where they are found, so that they
cannot well be regulated everywhere in the same way.
Thus in New Jersey the Supreme Court has recently up1 State v. Wright (N. J..), 23 Atl. Rep.,
2

116.

Consumers' Gas Trust Co. v. Harless, 131 Ind., 446.

' Cobb v. Bord, 40 Alinn., 479.
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held- an act establishing boards of street and water commissioners, with power to lay out, open and change the
lines of streets in cities of the first class, although admitting that streets and water supplies are common to all
, cities, great or small. "This legislation," said the Court,
"does not attempt to deal with these things from this wide
point of view. What it deals with is exclusively the
machinery by which such interests are to be regulated.
It is true that the classification of our cities is

. ....

made on the basis of population, but this term, in this
-connection, inckdes not only the number of the inhabitants, but also municipal magnitude in all respects; and a
city largely populous must necessarily have a great stretch
of streets and a water supply of immense volume. It is
the largeness of such necessities incident to a great population that differentiates cities of the first class from cities of
the other classes, and the consequence is that all legislation
regulative of such necessities on account of their magnitude
is obviously constitutional, as it is germane to the basis of
municipal classification."'
2
In the dissenting opinion in a recent California case,
the question was raised whether after general laws had been
passed for the incorporation, organization and classification
of cities in proportion to population, the legislature could
create, for a special municipal purpose, either a new classification or a single class differing from any included in the
general classification. Under the rule stated above, the
answer would be that this must depend on circumstances.
If the special municipal purpose was such as could not
*satisfactorily be attained by means of the old classification,
'anew classification, in whole or in part, would be admissible, but not otherwise.
Third.-Classification must not be based upon existing
circumstances only, or those of limited duration, except
where the object of the law is itself a temporary one.
'Il

re Haynes (N. J.), 22 At.

Rep., 923.

Cf. the language of

BEASIEY, C. J., in Van Ripur v. Parsons, 4o N. J. L. i, 9.
2 People

v. Henshaw, 76 Cal., 436.
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The object of this rule is to provide for the future, to,
make classification permanent while the membership of
each class may change with -varying circumstances.' The
characteristics of each class should be capable not only of
applying in the future to other members not originally
contained within it, but also of ceasing to apply to some or
all of its members so as to admit of their transfer to some
other class. If the membership of a class be unchangeable,
then the law applies only to the individual members and
never can apply to others. Such a law is clearly special.
If Cincinnati be the only city in Ohio that has or ever.
can have a population of 200,ooo by the census of 1870,

or Columbus the only city of the second class with -a
population of over 31,ooo by the same census, or Akron
the only city of the second grade of the third class
with a population df 12)512 at the census of 188o, then
laws passed for all cities to which those circumstances
apply are passed for Cincinnati or Columbus or Akron
just as exclusively as -if they were specially named. 2 So,
too, an act requiring the -trustees of the sinking fund,
"heretofore appointed" in any city of the first grade of the
second class to perform certain official acts within five days,
there being but one such city with such trustees, can never
I This rule seems to be practically admitted by the Court in ex ,are
Wells, 21 Fla., 280, 320, where an act applying to all cities and towns

incorporated under the incorporation act then in force was silstained, as
all those in the State were so incorporated. The Court said : "So far as
concerns cities and towns to be organized under any subsequent legislation, if the Act of 1869 shall be simply repealed, there will be no subsequent legislation; if it shall be amended, and the amendment exclude'subsequently organized cities and towns from the scope of this act, the,
question will be upon the validity of this amendatory provision, but it
the Act of 1869 is entirely supplanted by another statute, such statute
will provide whether the act in question shall stand a part of the new
system or fall altogether." It must be conceded that the act was peculiar, for there could be no valid reason for applying it to the'cities and
towns incorporated under the act then in force rather than to all cities
and towns generally, but the Court apparently took the view that the act
was general because it provided for the future as long as it should itself
be in force.
2 State v. Covington, 29 0. St., 102; State v. Mitchell, 31 id., 592;
State 'v. Anderson, 44 id., 247.
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apply to any but that one city.' All classifications by
population or other circumstances existing at the time of
the passage of the act only,2 or at the last census,' or by the
voting population at a particular election 4 is, therefore,
invalid, and it has been held in Kansas that the same is
true if any limit be set to the time within which members
may be admitted to the class.'
Similarly an act confirming the rights of all citizens
of the State who have, since a certain specified date, used
or occupied grounds under the tide-waters for the planting
and cultivation of oysters, is special, as the rights of such
persons do not differ from those of other citizens who might
make the same use of similar grounds for a like period at
any subsequent time.'
I State v. Pugh, 43 0. St., 98.
State v'. Herrmann, 75 Mo., 340; State v. Jackson Co. Court, 89

2

id., 237; Gibbs v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq., 226; Randolph v. Wood, 49
N. J. L., 85; affirmed, 50 id., 175; Hudson v. Buck, 49 id., 228; Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa., 258. In Hudson Co. v. Buck, stpra, the
terms of the act were general, viz., that wherever supervisors, appointed
under an act, had heretofore constructed a road running through two.
or more cities, towns, or townships, or through or in a city and one or
more towns or townships in any county, and the cost of the improvement
had been assessed in a particular way, and the maintenance and repair
of the road was not provided for, every such road should be a county
road, and the county should be liable for its maintenance and original
cost; but this broad language did not help the matter.
3 Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L., 58; Zeigler v. Gaddis, id.,
363; Pavonia H. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 45 id., 279; State v. Covington,
29 0. St., 102; State v. Mitchell, 31 id.,'59 2 ; McGill v. State, 34 id., 228;
State v. Anderson, 44 id., 247; Woodard v. Brien, 14 Lea (Tenn.), 520,
Burkholtz v. State, i6 id., 71.
State v. Boyd, 19 Nev., 43.
Topeka v. Gillett, 32 Kan., 431. The statute in that case provided
that "No city of the second class should avail itself of the provisions of
this act after the first day of May, and not unless the city council shall,
within ten days from the time of the taking effect of this act, give notice
by resolutions passed by a majority of its council, of the intention of the
city to avail itself of the proyisions of this act, ....
.provided
that
this act shall not apply to cities of less than 6ooo inhabitants." This
-%vas held unconstitutional, as having no room to operate upon all of a
class of things, present and prospective."
6 State v. Post (N. J., 1893), 26 AtI. Rep., 683. "The law," said the
Court, "can never apply to any persons other than those to whom it
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In a solitary case in New Jersey,1 the Supreme Court
sustained an act empowering the mayors of such cities as
should accept it before a certain date to appoint certain
municipal officers, saying that as all cities had the opportunity of accepting the act within the time fixed, and
might all avail themselves of it, it must be regarded as
applicable to all cities, and therefore general. This statement, which does not accord with the line of New Jersey
authorities, 2 was in reality only a dictum, unnecessary to
the decision of the case, the election having taken place
within the time, and the act having specially provided that
unconstitutionality as to any part should not violate the
rest. The Court of Errors and Appeals declined to pass
upon the point,3 but had it done so, it could hardly have
sustained this part of the act.
ie effect of a classification by existing circumstances
is also produced where the operation of a law is, by any of
its provisiotis, confined to the existing members of a class.
If a law for the government of cities of a certain class
requires certain acts, necessary to the establishment of the
system of government proposed, to be done within a certain
limited time or under circumstances peculiar to one or more
cities, such acts can only be done by the cities composing
the class at that time, or where the required circumstances
exist, and the result is the same as if the law were passed
for those cities only and no others. Thus an act establishing a municipal board in cities of a certain grade, and
requiring the bond of each member of the board to be
approved by the judges of the Superior Court of the city,
applied at the time of its enactment. 'Occupancy, planting and staking
the ground constitutes the meritorious ground for the grant, and are the
basis of the classification upon which a law, to be valid, must be framed.
The legislature

.

.

.

. cannot limit immunity to those who have

planted and staked the ground at the passage of the act. 'That is the
vice of this law. It does not embrace all of the class according to a legal
basis of classification.".
1

In re Cleveland, 5I N. J. L., 31i.

Coutieri v. New Brunswick, 44 N. J. L., 58; Zeigler v. Gaddis, id.,
363; Favonia H. R. Co. v. Jersey City, 45 id., 2793In re Cleveland, 52 N. J. L., 188.
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is clearly local if only one city has, or can have under
legislation existing at the time of the passage of the act, a
"'Superior Court." 1
. In the case of an act empowering cities of a certain
grade to issue bonds and borrow money for a natural gas
plant, if the citizens should so authorize by vote at the
next municipal or general election, it was recently held in
Ohio that the act was general because it covered the case
of cities which had come into that grade in time to vote on
the subject, though after the act was passed.' It would.
seem, though, that the act was really special, because its
operation was restricted to the cities of a certain grade at
the time of certain particular elections only; unless,
indeed, the uncert~anty -ofthe natural gas supply could be
held to make the acquisition of a gas plAnt a temporary
.object.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently
refused to declare a municipal government law to. be
unconstitutional which fixed the dates at which certain
acts were to be done to put the government into operation
in the class of cities to which the law applied, and for the
reason that on the admission of any new member to the
class, the legislature, or possibly the Governor, could bring
such new members within the operation of the law by fixing new dates for the necessary acts. 3 If the Governor had
this power under existing laws (which was admittedly uncertain), this decision was correct, but otherwise it was
logically wrong. Undoubtedly the interests of the city of
Pittsburgh might have suffered from the overthrow of the
law regulating its. government, and the affairs of that city
alone were involved in the case, yet to admit that the act
might need amendment was to admit its unconstitutionality.
The Court said: " The Act of 1887 isgeneral in terms, and
it is clearly applicable to all members of the class as it was
then composed, and answered the test laid down in WeinI State v.
2

Smith, 48 0. St., 211.
State v. Toledo, 4S 0. St., 112.
Pittsburgh's Petition, 138 Pa., 4o.
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man v. Pass. Ry. Co.,' and kindred cases,"-i. e., that it
"must be applicable to all the members of the class to
which it relates, and must be directed to the existence and
regulation of municipal powers and to matters of local
government." The same Court had, however, declared in
Commonwealth v. Patton,' that a general law must not
apply to the members of the class as it was then composed
only, but must provide for future members, and the words
in Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co.,3 "all the members of the
class," must, therefore, be understood as meaning future as
well as present members.
In the case of laws intended to provide for temporary
objects, as also -here a class of cases must temporarily be
expected from the operation of a law, a really distinctive
class may, and sometimes must, be based upon existing or
temporar - cumstances.' Thus taxes previously assessed
to pay judgments recovered against school districts or other
municipal corporations may be legalized by a general law,
the circumstances beingsuch that the municipal corporations
to be affected constitute a real class ; ' but where, though the
the law be couched in general terms, it is clear that temporary
circumstances which mark the class exist in but one or a
very few instances, such a law is local or special.6
i8 Pa.,
2 88

192.

Pa., 258.

118 Pa., 192.
4Thus where, in a statute of limitation of suits to foreclose mortgages, those suits in which invalid attempts at foreclosure had been
made, and had proceeded as far fs an actual sale, were excepted, the
classification was sustained because in no other way could injustice to the
excepted class of mortgages be avoided. The fact that their rights
needed protection constituted them a class, though a temporary one:
Cobb v. Bord, 40 Minn. 479, cited, supra.
5 Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Soper, 39 1o., 112.
6 Devine v. Commrs., 84 Ill., 59o. The act was limited in its operation to counties of over ioo,ooo inhabitants, and its objects wire stated to
be "for erecting a court house on the site heretofore used for that purpose, and a jail and other necessary buildings for the use of the said
county at such points as may be selected, and for the purpose of funding
the floating debt." It also referred to the "recent destruction by fire of
public buildings." It was held unconstitutional as operating upon Cook
County only, and being for a temporary purpose.
3
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Fourth.-To whatever class a law may apply, it must
apply equally to each member thereof.1
Its exception of any member of a class from the application of a new law, or any variation of its application
(unless caused by the existence of prior unrepealed local
or special laws),' is in fact a new classification to which
all the foregoing rules apply. Where, for instance, the
constitution forbids special laws changing the location of
county seats, a law providing that such change shall
be made by a majority vote of the citizens cannot also
provide that where such change had been made before
the passage of the act, it sho.uld not again be made
except by a two-thirds vote ; ' since the only reason why a
law which adopts certain methods for the members of one
class, but different ones for those of another class is, or can
be held, general, is that it treats all alike who' are in the
same situation. 4 "
. Hence also, in those States where uniformity of operation is regarded as essential to general legislation, it is held
that where a classification of cities has been already established on a proper basis for municipal ptirposes, no subsequent law regulating municipal affairs can be held general
if its application be limited to such members of a class as
may vote to adopt it.'
"*Exparle Wells, 21 Fla., 280; Reynolds v. Poster, 89 Ill., 257;
Weinman v. Pass. Ry. Co., xi8 Pa., 192, 202.
2 In Commonwealth v. Macferron, 752 Pa. 250, WILLIAMS, J., said
that the rule that a previous local statute is not repealed by a subsequent
general law, unless by express words of repeal, did not apply to the
Pennsylvania municipal corporation laws. It is clear that these acts
were binding upon cities of the first and second classes, there being, at
the time of their passage, but one of each class, but the law for cities of
the third class was expressly limited to affect only those that accepted it.
3Nichols v. Walter, 37 Minn., 264.
State v. Cons. Va. Min.Co., x6 Yev., 432, 449. In Peop. v. Cent.
Pac. R. R. Co., 83 Cal., 393, 410, it is said, citing exparteWesterfield, 55
id., 550, that there are exceptions to the rule that a general law is one
which applies to all the members of a class, but the suggestion made in
that case was that certain classes of persons were outside the class to
which the law properly applied, not that they were to be specially
exdepted from its operation.
5 Scranton School Dist.'s App., 113 Pa., 176.
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Flh.-If the classification be valid, the number of
members in a class is wholly immaterial.
If the classification involved in any law be improper,
a court may take notice of the fact that the alleged class
contains but one or a very few members,' but otherwise one
member may constitute a class as properly as a hundred.2
The fact that one member may constitute a class is, however, one of the objections most frequently made to the
whole system of classification. It is urged, for instance,
that to legislate for a class known to be composed of one
city only is to legislate for that one city, and that this is
local legislation forbidden by the constitution. That such
legislation is often practically special must be admitted,
but if it is so by force of circumstances only, and not by
the direct provisions of the law itself, then it must from a
legal point of view be regarded as general.
To illustrate the application of these rules it may be
1 State v. Herrmann, 75 Mo., 34o; Zeigler v. Gaddis, 44 N.J. L., 363;

Commonwealth v. Patton, 88 Pa., 258.
2 Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77-Pa., 338. It had been contended by
counsel that the right to classify, even if it existed, could not be so exercised as to form a class containilig one city only; that such classification
involved legislation for that one city, to the exclusion of all others-i. e.,
local and special legislation. The Court said, however: "This argument
is plausible, but unsound. It is true the only city in the State at the
present time containing a population of over 300,000 is the city of Philadelphia. It is also true that the city of Pittsburgh is rapidly approaching
that number, if it has not already reached it by recent enlargement of its
territory. Legislation is intended not only to meet the wants of the
present but to provide for the future. It deals not with the past, but, in
theory at least, anticipates the needs of a State, healthy with a vigorous
development. It is intended to be permanent. At no distant day Pittsburgh will probably become a city of the first class, and Scranton or
others of the rapidly-growing interior towns will take the place of the
city of Pittsburgh as a city of the second class. In the meantime is
classification of the cities of the first class bad because Philadelphia is
the only one of the class? We think not. Classification does not depend
upon numbers." To the same effect are Darrow v. People, 8 Col., 417;
Ex !parteWells, 21 Fla., 280; Haskel v. Burlington, 3010., 232 ; State v.
Graham, 16 Neb., 74; State v/. Donovan, 2o Nev., 75. Mortland v.
Christian, 52 N. J. L., 52X, 537 ; Matter of Church, 92 N. Y., z ; State v.
Hudson, 44 0. St., 137; Marmet v. State, 45 id., 63; Fellows v. Walker,
39 Fed. Rep., 65I.
55
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as well to consider, as the courts have often been required
to do of late, what is a proper basis for the classification of
, counties, cities or other municipal bodies. That such
classification cannot be based upon existing differences of
" local government resulting from prior special legislation has
"een already stated. Unquestionably the most usual basis
* for the classification of cities and other municipal bodies,
and-where necessary, of counties also, is population. Some-times the total number of inhabitants is -taken, while in
other cases the number of registered voters or the votes
polled at a general election have been regarded. Such a
classificdtion adapts itself to'the changes which necessarily
occur from time to time, yet marks an essential distinction
between different localities, and the distinction so marked
*
requires to be taken account of in legislation. In other
. respects besides population, however, cities and counties
may differ to an extent which legislation must take account
of. The leading. case on classification in Pennsylvania
dwells upon the essential differences between seaboard and
inland cities as warranting differences in legislation, and
this view has never been abandoned there, while in other
States also the courts have declared that differences in location, in the industries carried on, or in the conduct or condition of the people would be taken into consideration.'
In the Pennsylvania case of Commonwealth v. Patton,"
it is said obiter that "there can be no proper classification
of' cities or counties except by population," but this,
though perhaps true of a case llke that then before the
* court, was presumably not intended, and certainly cannot
be accepted, as a general proposition, applicable in all
cases. Section 17 of the Act of March 31, 1876," in regard
to county officers, for instance, applies to cities of over
300,000 inhabitants and co-extensive in boundaries with the

county. The word "class" is not used, but it is practically
I Wheeler v. Philadelphia, 77 Pa., 338.
2 State v. Hunter, 39 Kan., 578, 590.

3 88 Pa., 258.
41 Pur. Dig., 385, pl. 19.
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a classification of cities by population and extent of territory. The propriety of this classification has not been
questioned, and the section has been treated by the
Supreme Court as perfectly constitutional.'
In New Jersey four classes of cities are established for
the purpose of municipal legislation, the first and second
being by population only; the third including all others,
except seaside or summer resorts on the Atlantic Ocean,
and the fourth including those excepted from the third.
While this classification is approved, it is held that the
question of whether it can be justified for the purpose of the
particular legislation must still arise in every case.2
In Florida it has been held that the financial condition
of cities may be a proper basis of classification for certain
purposes, and that an act to dissolve municipal corporations and establish provisional governments, when any such
corporation, being indebted to the extent of $2oo,ooo,
should be in default on its interest, was a general law for
the establishment of municipal government, within the
meaning of the constitution, such act itself creating a new
class of municipal corporations, and imposing like duties
and bestowing like powers on each municipality of the
class.3 As municipal government is the acknowledged
weak point of American political institutions, a classification which enables insolvent cities to be placed under a
different and presumably more economical form of government than that under which they have become insolvent
may be very useful.'
It was recently attempted in New Jersey to make the
'Taggart v. Commonwealth, 102 Pa., 354;
Oellers, 140 id., 457.
2 In re Assessment (N. J.), 23 Atl. Rep., 517..
3
Exparte Wells, 21 Fla., 28o.
4

Commonwealth v.

Except under some such state of circumstances, clasgification by
the almighty dollar is not permissible. Thus, the Supreme Court of
South Dakota has recently held that the possession of a court-house and
jail worth $35,ooo is not a proper basis for the classification of counties,
even in regard to the relocation of county seats: Edmonds v. Herbiandson, 5o N. W. Rep., 970.
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amount of taxable property, together with other circumThe various
stances, a basis of municipal classification.
circumstances having no relation to each other, the classification was held to be invalid,' but whether it could have
been based on the amount of taxable property alone was
not decided.
A very doubtful authority as to the classification of
counties is Matter of Church,' where an act was held general which conferred certain powers (as to the opening of
streets and the assessing of adjacent properties for the cost)
upon county boards in " any county containing an incorporated city of ioo,ooo pbpulation and upwards, when any
territory within such county and beyond the limit of such
city has been mapped out into streets and avenues in purThe Court said: "The act relates to a
suance of law."
class and applies to it as such, and not to the selected or
particular elements of which it is composed. The class
consists of every county in the State having within its
borders a city of Ioo,ooo inhabitants, and territory beyond
the citylimits mapped out into streets and avenues." The
Court seems to have accepted this classification without
investigating its nature very closely. Had the language
been "mapped out into streets and avenues in pursuance
of a. general law," more might have been said in favor of
the act as general, but it would seem thai in point of fact
this mapping out had been done under one or more special
laws, so that the class which was contemplated depended
This being so, it
on special legislation for its existence.
could not be a true class, a genus. Whatever value this
case may have is weakened by the fact that the same act
,excepted by name the town of Flatbush, and the city and
county of New York from its operation. It should have
been held special for that reasbn if for no other.
It follows from the doctrine embodied in the rules
.above set forth that whenever a city ceases to possess the
characteristics of the class to which it has previously
' State v. Somers Point, 52 N. J. L., 32.
292 N. Y., i.
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belonged for purpose of its government under laws for
classes of cities, and acquires the characteristics of another
class, its government must thenceforward be regulated by
the laws governing such latter class. Such a transition,
which, where the classification is by population, must
occur whenever the population changes so as to bring a
city within the limits of another class, works no change in
the government of a city except such as is required to
adjust it to the class into which it goes. The transition
"repeals no ordinances; it vacates no offices except those
which it abolishes, and makes no vacancies to be filled:
except by the creation of new offices." The mere fact of,
the traiisition does not .necessarily affect the tenure of any
office. Those in office serve out the terms for which they
were elected, and their successors are elected under the
laws regulating the .class into which the city has moved,
while those whose terms have not expired become possessed
of all the powers and are subject to all the duties pertaining
to the offices held 'by them in cities of -this latter class.
"The machinery of the-old government is to be used in i
adjusting the city to its position under the new,'?' but the
two systems cannot stand together, the old must be abandoned and the new followed.2 Hence, where in a city of
the third class the city treasurer was also collector of taxes,
and in cities of the second class these offices, on the passage of a city from the third to the second class, the treasurer ceased to be also collector of taxes.3
I Commonwealth v. Wyman, 137 Pa., 5o8.
Commonwealtb v. Macferron,
3 Ibid.
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